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HUMAN GENETIC ENGINEERING AND THE 
PROBLEMS OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 
Introduction
Many people nowadays do not consider the problem of the ethical implications 
of human genetic engineering (hereafter: HGE) a serious subject of discussion. 
There are both theoretical and practical reasons for adopting this sceptical at-
titude. As far as the former are concerned, our present knowledge of HGE is very 
modest: we cannot be sure what the limits of possible genetic transformations of 
human beings are and of the consequences of these transformations. Hence, it 
may be claimed that the whole debate has more in common with mere specula-
tion rather than with a serious discussion based on fi rm scientifi c evidence. The 
practical objection concerns the possible benefi ts of engaging in this discussion. 
It is often claimed that moral and social philosophers should deal with more 
urgent, and undoubtedly more ‘tangible’ problems, like the fair distribution of 
medical services in general, sexual discrimination, taxation etc. Being aware of 
the two aforementioned problems, we must acknowledge the fact that there is 
a fi erce ethical debate on HGE. A wide spectrum of views on HGE has been de-
veloped: from the so-called radical trans-humanists to radical bio-conservatives. 
The mere fact of there being a debate on a subject is not a suffi cient reason for 
treating this subject seriously. Nevertheless, I think that the discussion men-
tioned here is not without value. In consequence, the present paper has several 
aims. First, I would like to present the main theses raised in the context of the 
debate. In this respect, the following text may be seen as a kind of introduction 
to the moral problems of HGE. Second, I attempt to sketch a ‘map’ of distribu-
tive justice problems related to the development of HGE. I think these issues are 
worth discussing mainly for the following reason: the possibility of HGE poses 
moral challenges structurally different from the ones yielded by traditional so-
cial-moral issues. I will therefore try to elucidate these differences. The aim of 
the third part of the paper is to look at the discussed problem from the perspec-
tive of the Rawlsian theory of distributive justice. It is not a mainstream ap-
proach to the discussed issue, while it is typically analyzed from the perspective 
of human rights doctrine. I present and criticize the positions advanced by two 
prominent bioethicists, David Resnik and Colin Farrelly. Finally, some conclu-
sions and perspectives for further research are formulated.
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HGE as a subject of moral-philosophical discussion and research
As it has already been pointed out, many moral philosophers discard HGE as 
a problem which could be a subject for fully-fl edged moral-philosophical discus-
sion. On the other hand, such discussion actually takes place and engages promi-
nent social scientists, ethicists and philosophers. Undoubtedly, the progress of 
biosciences will more or less quickly verify the predictions formulated by theo-
rists, but nevertheless it seems necessary to develop some ethical framework to 
deal with possible scenarios. In order to discuss these issues it is necessary to 
introduce some important conceptual distinctions.
First, it is necessary to state what HGE amounts to. For the purposes of this 
article, I will refer to HGE as any medical procedure which involves the modifi -
cation of the genotype of an individual leading to changes in his/her phenotype. 
This defi nition is purposely very broad. The types of HGE may be classifi ed ac-
cording to different criteria. The most important distinction makes use of a teleo-
logical criterion. It is possible, then, to distinguish negative genetic engineering 
(genetic therapy, GT) and positive genetic engineering (genetic enhancement, 
GE).1 At fi rst glance, the difference between the two is obvious. GT’s aim is to 
cure diseases and disorders, while GE’s is to increase human skills above a ‘nor-
mal level.’ The introduction of the concept of ‘normality’ here leads immediately 
to serious conceptual problems. Let us start from a trivial observation that hu-
man beings typically suffer from many diseases during their lives, and that more 
or less serious deterioration of functioning of the body is a common characteristic 
of the process of ageing. If we defi ne GT as a process which leads from abnormal 
condition to normal condition of a human being, we ought to have some grasp of 
what a ‘normal’ or ‘healthy’ condition amounts to. Now, it would be unrealistic to 
demand the drawing of a sharp line here. In bioethics and in ethics in general, 
we are often forced to make use of vague terms and to ascribe great signifi cance 
to them, although they typically generate the peril of a slippery slope based ar-
gumentation. It is suffi cient to mention the concept of ‘competence’ employed in 
euthanasia/physician-assisted suicide debate.2 Still, we need at least a working 
set of criteria which would enable us to distinguish between the normal and ab-
normal features of a human being. I think that the only criterion which can be 
operational here is the classifi cation of diseases and disorders provided by a reli-
able source, like for instance the World Health Organization. Such a classifi ca-
tion of normal and abnormal states of human beings can be easily distinguished 
now from more or less preferred states. On the one hand it may be claimed that 
modest deterioration of senses, for example of hearing, is a quite normal symp-
1  Cf. for instance D.G. Jones, Enhancement: Are Ethicists Excessively Infl uenced by Baseless 
Speculations?, “Medical Humanities” 2006, vol. 32, pp. 77–81. See also D. Resnik, The Moral 
Signifi cance of the Therapy/Enhancement Distinction in Human Genetics, “Cambridge Quarterly 
of Healthcare Ethics” 2000, vol. 9, pp. 365–377.
2  For a survey concerning this subject, cf. M. Araszkiewicz, The Slippery Slope Argu-
ments against the Legalization of Physician-Assisted Suicide [in:] J. Stelmach, M. Soniewicka, 
W. Załuski (eds.), Studies in the Philosophy of Law, vol. 4: Legal Philosophy and the Challenges 
of Biosciences, Jagiellonian University Press, Cracow 2010, pp. 145–160. 
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tom of ageing, and consistently hold that this state is not preferred. Conversely 
it is consistent, although psychologically less plausible, for a subject to claim 
that although her state is abnormal (i.e., unhealthy), she prefers not to change it.
It is possible to provide several further distinctions within the scope of pro-
cesses referred to as GE. Jones proposes to introduce three categories of en-
hancement. Category 1 comprises procedures belonging to the ‘penumbra’ of the 
concept, being in fact variations of therapies. Category 2 encompasses extensions 
of abilities, exceeding those possessed by healthy persons. It is worth emphasiz-
ing that GE belonging to the category 2 typically neither restores nor protects 
human health. Its aim is to add something to standard human endowment, how-
ever, not to such a great extent that the performance of the enhanced would be 
always better than the performance of non-enhanced, talented or hard-working 
people. And fi nally, radical human transformations are gathered under the label 
of category 3. The expected results of category 3 GE are for instance spectacular 
longevity, greater intellectual capacities, much better abilities to control one’s 
emotions, or even completely novel abilities.3 I would like to state that it is the 
third category which sometimes makes the discussion of HGE something closer 
to futurology, or even science fi ction, than to a genuine moral-philosophical de-
bate. However, there is one aspect in which more or less imaginary prospects of 
radical human transformation are relevant nowadays in bioethical debate. They 
are seen as factors which transform the traditional ethos of medicine, leading to 
perceiving the symptoms of ageing as a kind of disease, and therefore something 
which ought to be to a large extent eliminated by medical interventions.4 This 
possibility may infl uence one’s attitude towards HGE in general. Let me now 
turn attention to different possible ethical stances that can be taken towards 
HGE.
As it was noted above, the attitudes towards HGE constitute a spectrum from 
radical trans-humanism to radical bio-conservatism. Although these concepts 
are used also in debates which do not touch the problem we discuss here, for our 
purposes we will deal with them solely in the context of HGE. I think that the po-
sition of trans-humanism is plausibly captured by the following general theses, 
referring to the problem of HGE:
[TRANS-HUMANISM THESES]
TT(1). We ought not to oppose to the development and application of HGE 
(normative thesis).
TT(2). HGE is benefi cial to mankind. In particular, the creation of post-hu-
mans is a prospect worth pursuing (assessment of consequences).
TT(3). Individuals should have broad freedom concerning the application of 
these technologies to themselves (the so-called morphological freedom).
TT(4). Parents should have freedom in deciding on the application of these 
technologies in the context of reproduction (reproductive freedom).5
3  D.G. Jones, op.cit., p. 79.
4  Ibidem.
5  The last two theses are borrowed from N. Bostrom, In Defense of Posthuman Dignity, 
“Bioethics” 2005, vol. 19, pp. 202–214.
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Obviously, it is possible to formulate accordingly the theses of bio-conserva-
tism:
[BIOCONSERVATISM THESES]
BT(1). We ought to oppose to the development and application of HGE.
BT(2). HGE is possibly disastrous to mankind. The possibility of there being 
transformed human beings poses a real danger.
BT(3). Individuals should not have an option to apply HGE technologies for 
the purposes of GE. GT should be available only in specifi ed conditions.
BT(4). The procreation function of human beings should be free from HGE.
It is not diffi cult to see that the freedoms (theses (3) and (4)) are in fact more 
specifi c versions of normative theses (theses (1)) and that theses (2), referring 
to assessment of the consequences, provide the justifi cation for the normative 
theses. In consequence, although the set presented above are instructive, I will 
narrow my analysis to theses TT(1) and BT(1) (normative ones) and TT(2) and 
BT(2) (related to the consequences).
TT(1) and BT(1) may be further refi ned according to Jones’ distinction of 
three categories of HGE discussed above. Application of these considerations 
enables us to formulate three versions of TT(1) – the Weak, the Moderate and 
the Radical: 
Weak TT(1). We ought not to oppose the development and application of HGE 
in the scope of category 1 of GE (although categories 2 and 3 are at least contest-
able).
Moderate TT(1). We ought not to oppose the development and application of 
HGE in the scope of categories 1 and 2 of GE (although category 3 is contestable).
Radical TT(1). We ought not to oppose the development and application of 
HGE in the scope of categories 1, 2 and 3.
Similarly, it is possible to construct three versions of BT(1). Let us now focus 
on TT(2) and BT(2). It seems quite obvious that the consequences which are sub-
ject to assessment of these theses may be also roughly divided into three groups: 
the results of category 1 GE, and GE’s belonging to higher categories. Typically, 
BT(2) is formulated in the literature in a radical form, referring mainly to the 
results of category 3 GE. The following passage is instructive in this respect:
In fact, cloning and inheritable genetic alterations can be seen as crimes against hu-
manity of a unique sort: they are techniques that can alter the essence of the human-
ity itself (and thus threaten to change the foundation of human rights) by taking hu-
man evolution into our own hands and directing it toward the development of a new 
species, sometimes termed the “posthuman.”6
As we can see, the detrimental effects of HGE discussed here consists of the 
‘alteration of humanity itself’ and consequently we have to state that they stem 
from category 3 GE. Therefore, it is not clear from the outset whether results 
potentially brought about by category 1 and 2 GE would be also assessed so 
6  Cf. G. Annas, L. Andrews and R. Isasi, Protecting the Endangered Human. Towards an 
International Treaty Prohibiting Cloning and Inheritable Alterations, “American Journal of 
Law & Medicine” 2002, vol. 28, p. 151. For a general overview of this attitude, cf. F. Fukuyama, 
Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of Biotechnology Revolution, Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 
New York 2002.
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negatively. However, the quotation below amply shows that bio-conservatives 
have an apparent tendency to treat slippery slope arguments seriously:
The movement towards a posthuman world can be characterized as ‘progress’ and 
enhancement of individual freedom in the area of procreation; but it also can be char-
acterized as a movement down the slippery slope to a neo-eugenics that will result in 
creation of one or more subspecies or superspecies of human. (...) It is the prospect of 
“genetic genocide” that calls for treating cloning and genetic engineering as potential 
weapons of mass destruction, and the unaccountable genetic researcher as a potential 
bioterrorist.7
As noted above, I cannot devote attention here to the problem of the structure 
and soundness of slippery slope arguments.8 Let us only state that the mecha-
nism of slippery slope leading from category 1 GE (for instance, the elimination 
of genes responsible for the Huntington disease from the genetic code of a foetus) 
to the creation of a group of hostile super-humans seems quite unrealistic. The 
link connecting the two states of affairs seems too remote. Therefore, the argu-
ment from destruction of human nature is not of great import when it comes 
to the assessment of GEs belonging to category 1, and, presumably, also to cat-
egory 2.
Let us now try to summarize the topic of HE as an object of moral-philosoph-
ical debate. There is a common distinction between GT and GE and it is com-
monly claimed that although GT is generally permissible, GE is controversial. 
A closer look at the problem leads to the conclusion that the two concepts are 
not very informative, and it is fruitful to engage in a more detailed analysis.9 
The Jonesian distinction of the three categories of GE was introduced. These 
preliminary considerations enabled us to present two model attitudes towards 
the discussed problem, namely, the position of trans-humanism and of bio-con-
servatism. The mentioned distinction of three categories of GE makes it possible 
to present a refi ned picture of both model attitudes. Typically, bio-conservatives 
object to the development of HGE, because they believe it will lead to adverse 
consequences, resulting in creating transformed human beings and destroying 
the very essence of humanity. They associate such results mainly with radical 
enhancement, but they tend to see the whole problem as ‘slippery-slope sensi-
tive’ and in consequence they also oppose minor and moderate enhancements. 
My claim here is that it is not necessary to take such dramatic scenarios into 
account in order to put the ethical justifi cation of GE in question. However, it is 
worth noting that the possibility of HGE introduces new factors into the domain 
of bioethics. It should be emphasized that the development of genetic engineer-
ing leads to categorical changes concerning our natural endowments: up till now, 
they were seen as characteristics of subjects rather than (market) resources. 
However, the situation will probably undergo a substantial change. This issue 
demands a deeper commentary. The next part of the paper is, therefore, devoted 
to some problems of distributive justice arising in the context of HGE. They will 
7  G. Annas et al., op.cit., p. 173.
8  See footnote 2 above.
9  This point is discussed very thoroughly by D. Resnik, The Moral Signifi cance…, especially 
p. 374. 
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be dealt with mainly from a utilitarian point of view, focusing on the adverse con-
sequences generated by the problem of unequal distribution of scarce resources.
Genetic engineering, genetic enhancement and distributive justice
Genetic enhancements are a type of resource, so the issue of their fair distri-
bution must be taken into consideration. It seems that the possibility of HGE 
leads to two separate groups of distributive justice problems. The fi rst question: 
how should the enhancements be distributed?, is dealt with in the literature 
nowadays and I will comment only on the most important contributions here. 
However, there is also a second question, namely, the question of fair distribu-
tion in genetically transformed society. This issue is problematic for moral theo-
ry fi rstly for the reason of uncertainty concerning the possible results of genetic 
enhancements and the possibility of creation of groups of transformed humans. 
I only signalize this second issue in this place. 
Let us concentrate, then, on the problem of the fair distribution of genetic 
enhancements. It is trivial to note that the posing of this question assumes the 
adoption of at least a weak form of TT(1) (or, conversely, the rejection of radical 
form of BT(1)). Keeping in mind that these assumptions may be contested, let us 
nevertheless focus on the merits of the problem. It is not surprising that also in 
the context of GE, the two model approaches are in tension: a liberal, effi ciency-
oriented approach and the more social, Rawlsian approach. It is not my aim here 
to discuss the confl ict between these two major traditions in moral theory. For 
the purposes of this paper, I shall assume the soundness of the claim that natu-
ralistic premises cannot serve as a foundation for a full-fl edged theory of jus-
tice.10 In consequence, the rest of the investigations here shall be devoted to the 
Rawlsian approach, and particularly to two attempt of application of Rawlsian 
theory to the problem of HE, formulated by Resnik11 and Farrelly.12 However, 
before that, although these issues are well-known, for the sake of readability 
I shall recall the most important principles advanced by John Rawls in his clas-
sic A Theory of Justice.13
10  This view is presented and supported by a nuanced argumentation in W. Załuski, The 
Limits of Naturalism. A Game-Theoretic Critique of Justice as Mutual Advantage, Zakamycze, 
Kraków 2006.
11  D. Resnik, Genetic Engineering and Social Justice. A Rawlsian Approach, “Social Theory 
and Practice” 1997, vol. 23, pp. 427–448.
12  For instance C. Farrelly, Genes and Social Justice. A Rawlsian Reply to Moore, “Bio-
ethics” 2002, vol. 16, pp. 72–83; idem, The Genetic Difference Principle, “The American Journal 
of Bioethics” 2004, vol. 4, pp. 21–28, and idem, Justice in the Genetically Transformed Society, 
“Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal” 2005, vol. 15, pp. 91–99. 
13  J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1971 (22nd printing 
1997). I am aware of the fact that Rawls modifi ed his views in his later work. However, the 
theory presented in A Theory of Justice has become an ethical conception of its own rights, and 
a major component of Rawlsian ethical tradition.
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According to Rawls, a theory of fair distribution ought to adopt two basic 
principles. The fi rst is referred to as the Equality Principle and the second one 
encompasses, in fact, two elements: the Difference Principle and the Principle of 
Fair Equality of Opportunity. Let us quote the according passage:
“First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic lib-
erty compatible with a similar liberty for others. [the Equality Principle – M.A.]
Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they 
are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage [the Difference 
Principle – M.A.] and (b) attached to positions and offi ces open to all [the Principle 
of Fair Equality of Opportunity – M.A.].”14
The Principle of Fair Equality of Opportunity (hereafter PFEO) is of cru-
cial importance in the context of discussed problem and therefore ought to be 
presented more deeply here. An important assumption in Rawls’ theory is that 
a fair distribution of resources is seen as not arbitrary. In other words, the dis-
tribution is fair if it is a result of the efforts of individuals, and not of their luck. 
Consequently, it the outcome of distribution process is affected by any arbitrary 
set of factors, the resulting inequality ought to be redressed in some way, for 
example, by means of redistribution. In particular, this refers to the outcomes of 
the so-called natural lottery. Since we do not choose form which parents we shall 
be born, our genetic endowment and social status are factors we are not in con-
trol of, and therefore they should be seen as arbitrary. Obviously, contemporary 
societies dispose of many mechanisms which are devised to mitigate the differ-
ence of social status resulting from birth. The prospect of HGE turns our atten-
tion to the genetic endowment of children as an arbitrary factor which possibly 
should be neutralized by social instruments governed by the PFEO.
Doubtlessly, our genes do infl uence our opportunities and are one of the fac-
tors generating inequality of opportunities. This statement does not force us to 
adopt some version of a fl awed doctrine of genetic determinism. Although envi-
ronmental factors often have a decisive infl uence on our success – or lack thereof 
– in our lives, the role of genetic endowment should not be underestimated. In 
consequence, a Rawlsian should presumably propose the adoption of some poli-
cies in order to decrease the amount of arbitrary inequalities here. Let me, then, 
briefl y present the accounts developed by two prominent Rawlsian bioethicists.
According to Resnik, the technical possibility of manipulating our genetic 
endowment can be seen as a chance of decreasing arbitrary inequalities.15 Of 
course, these inequalities can be dealt with by other means than GE, for example 
with social policies, for instance with positive discrimination. However, assum-
ing that safe, effective and cost-effi cient HGE would be at our disposal, it should 
be treated as an attractive method of compensation.16 As the author puts it: 
“a highly advanced genetics would completely undermine the natural lottery as 
we know it and change many ‘natural’ resources into ‘social’ ones.”17 
14  Ibidem, p. 60.
15  D. Resnik, Genetic..., p. 428.
16  Ibidem, p. 431. Resnik even quotes a passage from A Theory of Justice, which can be read 
as an anticipation of the problems discussed here. Cf. J. Rawls, op.cit., pp. 107–108.
17  D. Resnik, Genetic..., p. 432.
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If our genetically determined traits are qualifi ed as social resources and we 
are in the position of controlling them, it becomes necessary to specify the rules 
of this control. At the point of departure, Resnik makes use of the concept of ‘nor-
mal opportunity range’ coined by another prominent Rawlsian, Norman Daniels, 
in his book Just Health Care.18 Normal opportunity range is the spectrum of 
life plans reasonable persons in a society are likely to construct for themselves. 
Diseases are factors which result in complications, and even impossibility of the 
realization of such plans, reasonable for healthy people. In consequence, dis-
eases should be seen as factors causing arbitrary inequalities and therefore so-
ciety ought to provide some compensation for sick people. Fair distribution of 
resources should lead to increase of chances for the worse off. In consequence, 
health care institutions ought to promote equality of opportunities.
Resnik makes use of Daniels’ framework by developing the following line of 
thought. PFEO, together with the concept of normal opportunity range, justifi es 
HE as methods of treatment of genetic diseases. This is due to the fact that there 
are no reasons that would force us to treat genetic and non-genetic diseases dif-
ferently. In consequence, Rawls-Daniels theory provides a solid ground for the 
application of GT. Moreover, GEs could also be acceptable, given that they do 
not lead to a ‘levelling’ of opportunities and that they are to the mutual benefi t 
of everyone.19 
However, the possibility of HGE introduces a new factor into the fore. Note 
that in the context of classical, i.e. non-genetic health care, we are able to state 
quite precisely what the normal species functioning of a human being amounts 
to. Now, in the context of HGE, this – previously fi xed – assumption becomes 
a variable. Resnik rightly observes that in this new context we have to introduce 
a notion of ‘genetic normality’ and that this notion has to be normative;20 if we 
omit to do this, we would not be able to make use of Rawlsian principles of fair 
distribution. The author discusses three normative versions of the concept of 
genetic normality and fi nally chooses the most moderate and reasonable one, 
namely, the concept of Genetic Minimums and Maximums (GMM).21 According 
to this account, all new children will have genes that place their life prospects 
within a normal range between acceptable minimum and maximum genetic re-
sources.22 This stance has obvious advantages, because it is quite fl exible, in 
principle allows for all kinds of GT and moreover does not preclude some reason-
able GEs (presumably these which not exceed the category 2 in Jones’ classifi -
cation). On the other hand, it remains vague as to what this means for genetic 
resources to be at acceptable maximum. The same problem, although to a less 
extent, applies to a genetic minimum.
Resnik offers a plausible answer to this question. He claims that we face 
a similar situation when we take other types of primary goods into account, and 
somehow we have to cope with this situation. This argument may be referred to 
as a positive one. However, Resnik has a negative argument, too. According to 
18  Ibidem, p. 434.
19  Ibidem, p. 435.
20  Ibidem, pp. 437–438. 
21  Ibidem.
22  Ibidem.
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him, moderate restrictions on HGE are justifi ed better from a moral point of view 
than a total ban of this kind of activity or no restrictions at all. In consequence, 
he formulates the following policy implications: (1) in principle, any discrimina-
tion based on genetic endowment should not be permissible, (2) all members of 
society, especially the worst-off, should be provided with some minimal level of 
genetic health, (3) HE should be in principle acceptable, excluding modifi cations 
that would exceed maximum genetic levels (this is similar to category 3 GEs in 
Jones’ account) and (4) in consequence, there ought to be no general moratorium 
on HE research.23 
The position advocated by Resnik may be summarized as follows. Genetic 
engineering is morally permissible and it can be even demanded for the sake 
of fair distribution of resources. In particular, GT is justifi ed on the basis of the 
PFEO. The same applies, albeit with qualifi cations, to GE, although the scope of 
enhancement ought not to exceed some fi xed threshold. It is the state (govern-
ment) who ought to be responsible for the distribution of HE resources; in conse-
quence, these resources should not be subordinated to any kind of free movement 
of goods principle. Prohibition of HGE may have very adverse consequences, and 
therefore it should not be adopted.24 Some genetic inequalities are tolerable if 
and only if they do not interfere with the principles of distributive justice, most 
notably the PFEO. 
Another well-known bioethicist, Colin Farrelly, advances a slightly differ-
ent position, although he remains in the boundaries of Rawlsian framework. 
According to this author, there are three plausible candidate formulas for a prop-
er principle of distributive justice in the context of HGE. Farrelly assesses them 
against two chosen criteria, namely, their ability to cope with the so-called cur-
rency problem and the so-called weight problem. The currency problem concerns 
the list of genetic advantages/disadvantages that are to be included in an account 
of the demands of distributive justice. The problem of weight deals with the rela-
tive importance of genetic disadvantages of the people as opposed to other types 
of disadvantages.25 In other words, the currency problem touches the well-known 
distinction between GE and GT. The problem of weight, however, is not so often 
dealt with by bioethicists. 
Farrelly compares the following three principles of fair distribution of genetic 
endowments:
1) GE – Genetic Equality Principle. Everyone should have the same genetic 
potential.
2) GDM – Genetic Decent Minimum Principle. Everyone should have genetic 
potential which exceeds some minimum threshold.
3) GDP – Genetic Difference Principle. Genetic endowments ought to be dis-
tributed to the greatest possible benefi t of the worst-off. 
These three principles are based on major ethical theories: egalitarianism, 
suffi citarianism and prioritarianism (Rawlsianism).26 Farrelly dismisses the GE, 
23  Ibidem, p. 441.
24  Ibidem, p. 443.
25  Cf. C. Farrelly, The Genetic..., p. 21.
26  Ibidem, p. 23 ff.
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for it does not deal satisfactorily with the currency problem (the very issue of 
equalization of genetic endowments is counterintuitive and potentially danger-
ous) and with the problem of weight (such equalization could be so costly that 
it would possibly preclude the equalization of other types of resources, which 
would be undesirable for most of the egalitarians).27 The principles of genetic 
decent minimum (GDM) states that the fair distribution of genetic endowments 
should guarantee that everybody should have some genetically determined traits 
exceeding a certain minimal threshold. However, it is diffi cult to specify the cat-
alogue of traits which should satisfy this minimum condition; in consequence, 
the currency problem is as least as problematic for the GDM as for the GE. 
Moreover, as Farrelly rightly points out, not all of the resources typically cho-
sen by suffi citarianists as the most basic ones, are genetically determined.28 But 
the GDM does even worse in the context of the problem of weight. The author 
emphasizes that when one takes scarcity of resources seriously enough (and, 
implicitly, if the chosen minimum threshold exceeds substantially the status 
quo) then the principles in question either requires the impossible, or involves 
prioritization of the factors which should pass the threshold test. The former 
option cannot be accepted for obvious reasons; the latter generates a plethora of 
additional problems.29
Taking the mentioned problems into account, Farrelly proposes a prioritarian 
account to the problem of the distribution of HGE. He formulates the so-called 
Genetic Difference Principle (GDP), which is a genetic-endowment-oriented ver-
sion of Rawls’ difference principle. According to the GDP, genetic endowments 
ought to be distributed to the benefi t of the least advantaged.30 Farrelly states 
that the GDP deals well with the currency problem. The genetic endowments 
advanced by the GDP are included in Rawlsian catalogue of ‘natural primary 
goods’ that all rational people are interested in, for instance health and vigour, 
intelligence, imagination.31 Simultaneously, the author engages in a discussion 
with Rawls and he states that the stringent interpretation of the GDP, according 
to which the interests of the worst off are given absolute priority. He claims that 
this stringent version of the principle is untenable in the context of the problem 
of weight (assuming scarcity of resources). In consequence, Farrelly promotes 
a modifi ed version of the principle, to which he refers to as the lax GDP. Let us 
formulate this principle:
Lax GDP. Inequalities in the distribution of genes important to the natural 
primary goods are to be arranged so that they are to the greatest reasonable 
benefi t of the least advantaged.32
In consequence, the lax GDP does not ascribe absolute priority to the benefi t 
of the least advantaged. Moreover, Farrelly does not want to place the principle 
into any order (like Rawls does in his opus magnum with the so-called basic 
27  Ibidem, p. 24. Let us note that Farrelly distinguishes two interpretations of GE (and 
GDM): broad and narrow. However, we shall omit this distinction here.
28  Ibidem. 
29  Ibidem, p. 25.
30  Ibidem.
31  Ibidem. Cf. Also C. Farrelly, Justice..., p. 93.
32  C. Farrelly, The Genetic..., p. 26.
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principles of justice). Rather, he insist on its pro tanto and discursive character. 
Moreover, he does not intend to defi ne concepts which appear in the formulation 
of the principle in technical terms (as Rawls does). In consequence, his proposi-
tion remains quite indeterminate, but this result, according to the author, should 
be seen as an advantage.33 Farrelly states that the lax GDP, as opposed to highly 
sophisticated principles of distributive justice, can be applied in non-ideal situa-
tions in practice. We will return to this problem in the remaining part of the text.
The most important value which has to be balanced with the benefi t of the ge-
netically least advantaged in the value of reproductive freedom. Farrelly propos-
es a set of postulates labelled “Reasonable Genetic Intervention Model” (RGIM), 
designed to protect the realization of reproductive freedom in the context of po-
tential confl ict with other important social objections. He eventually claims that 
the lax GDP, together with the RGIM, provide a good starting point for ethical 
discussions concerning the distribution of resources provided by HGE.34
Let us now comment briefl y on the positions adopted by Resnik and Farrelly. 
Both conceptions are situated in between radical trans-humanism and radical 
bio-conservatism. It is a trivial observation that both of the authors are not bio-
conservatives: they adopt a moderately optimistic attitude towards the applica-
tion of HGE in social practice. Resnik seems to adopt the Moderate Version of 
TT(1): we ought not to oppose the development and application of HGE in the 
scope of categories 1 and 2 of GE. This conclusion stems from the fact that Resnik 
does not oppose genetic enhancement unless it leads to a genetic caste society. In 
consequence, he rejects the idea of GEs belonging the third category. Resnik is 
a partial opponent of TT(2). He argues that HE is possibly benefi cial to mankind, 
but he does not accept the possible emergence of genetic castes and, a fortiori, 
the creation of human superspecies. As far as morphological and reproductive 
freedoms (TT(3) and TT(4)) are concerned, Resnik adopts a refi ned and moder-
ate attitude. First, he claims that the distribution of GE (and GT) ought to be 
regulated by the state. He is an opponent of market approach to genetic enhance-
ments. Lack of proper regulation may activate slippery slope mechanisms and ul-
timately lead to the creation of a new species of humans. However, a general ban 
on HGE may lead to identical results. In consequence, Resnik advocates some 
form of cautious, governmental regulation of the problem.35 Simultaneously, he 
is aware of the fact that governmental authority to regulate distribution of these 
resources is a controversial issue.36 He adopts a moderate attitude towards the 
reproductive freedom, too. According to him, parental rights ought to be limited 
in order to prevent unintended, disastrous social effects.37
Farrelly’s views seem to be a somewhat less determinate than those adopted 
by Resnik, and this seems to be a conscious choice of the former author. He also 
seems to accept a Moderate Version of TT(1), although within his conception it is 
not in principle impossible to accept a Radical Version of TT(1). In consequence, 
Farrelly’s conception is open for acceptance of TT(2) in its entirety, although 
33  Ibidem.
34  Ibidem, pp. 27–28.
35  Cf. D. Resnik, Genetic..., p. 443.
36  Ibidem, p. 444.
37  Ibidem, supra.
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this prospect seems implausible, given the authors insistence of reasonableness 
in distributive justice decisions. It seems also that Farrelly is more ready to 
adopt at least partial market freedom of genetic enhancements (TT(3)).38 As far 
as reproductive freedom is concerned, Farrelly proposes a view which consider-
ably differs from the one adopted by Resnik. Let us recall that the author is 
an advocate of RGIM. One of purposes of this model is to allocate burdens of 
argumentation in a debate between proponents and opponents of HGE. Now we 
are in a proper position to comment on this issue more specifi cally. The RGIM 
presents itself as follows:
With respect to genetic interventions, the reproductive freedom of a parent 
can be limited if:
1. The objective behind the measure which requires limiting this freedom 
relates to concerns which are pressing and substantial in a free and demo-
cratic society.
and,
2. (a) The means chosen to restrict reproductive freedom are rationally con-
nected to the objective.
(b) The measure impairs as little as possible reproductive freedom.
(c) There must be proportionality between the effects of the measure which 
are responsible for limiting reproductive freedom and the objective 
which has been identifi ed as of suffi cient importance.39
This exposition reveals clearly that, according to Farrelly, it is the opponent 
of HE who ought to argue for limitations of reproductive freedom of parents, and 
that this opponent is faced with a diffi cult task of proving four, quite diffi cult 
premises. If we look at the RGIM in the context of acceptance of possible free 
market regulation of the HGE, we may state that Farrelly’s conception does not 
include an operational mechanism blocking the potential slippery slope, result-
ing in a genetic caste society and eventually the creation of a new human species. 
This is, undoubtedly, the most important practical difference between the two 
authors. However, there are also some important, methodological and theoreti-
cal discrepancies between them, which are worth discussing here.
First, Resnik develops his position assuming counterfactually that safe, effec-
tive and cost-effi cient HGE is at our disposal. This enables him to concentrate 
on the issue of equality of opportunities in society. Farrelly, to the contrary, 
ascribes greater weight to the problem of costs. In this respect, the positions of 
the both authors are incomparable. However, it seems that Resnik’s strategy is 
more proper from methodological point of view. Farrelly dismisses some princi-
ples of distributive justice due to the fact they would be too costly in realization. 
However, it is not clear why he assumes that the GDP, adopted by him, passes 
this test.
Secondly the most important theoretical difference between the authors is 
that while Resnik ascribes a central role to the Principle of Fair Equality of 
Opportunity (PFEO), Farrelly concentrates on his version of the Difference 
Principle, namely, the lax GDP. Resnik claims that GE (and, of course, GT) are 
38  This is emphasized mainly in C. Farrelly, Justice..., p. 91 ff.
39  Cf. C. Farrelly, The Genetic..., p. 27.
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morally justifi ed, unless they distort the equality of opportunities rather than 
support it. He makes use of the concept of ‘genetic normality’ and states that 
the use of HGE infringes the PFEO if it results in exceeding the boundaries 
of genetic normality. The scope of the latter concept ought to be defi ned, pre-
sumably in an authoritative manner. Farrelly concentrates on the benefi t of the 
least advantaged; however, he relaxes this stringent postulate by introducing 
the criterion of reasonableness. He is aware of the almost hopeless vagueness 
of the term, yet he insists on its importance in the discussion. He claims that 
it is less diffi cult to specify what counts as unreasonable in the context of the 
distribution of resources.40 In consequence, the lax GDP serves as a tool for de-
termining boundary conditions for a distributive decision rather than a criterion 
for singling out a concrete conclusion. Moreover, it seems that there is a tension 
between the lax GDP and the RGIM. The former one seems to assume a cautious 
and limited approach to the distribution of HGE, while the latter undoubtedly 
supports broad distribution of genetic enhancements. While the formulation of 
lax GDP is distinct from the premises blocking reproductive freedom specifi ed 
in the RGIM, the relation between the two remains unclear. Resnik proposes 
a well-defi ned default rule in his conception.
Thirdly, Farrelly’s conception is, in fact, close to situation ethics. Resnik 
adopts rather a rule-based approach. The choice between these two model ap-
proaches yields diffi cult questions which cannot be discussed here in depth. 
Nevertheless, it seems that in the context of risky prospects (and the possibil-
ity of the broad application of HGE belongs to this class), it is more prudent 
to propose a set of coherent default rules, like Resnik does. Although Farrelly 
also attempts to provide such a set, unfortunately his proposition is internally 
confl icted. The introduction of the notion of reasonableness into the conception 
is not very helpful, too. Isn’t it the case that almost every contemporary ethical 
conception adopts it, at least implicitly?
Our comparative analysis may be summarized as follows. David Resnik’s pro-
posal of application of Rawlsian ethical thinking to the problems of HGE seems 
to be more internally coherent and more operational than the approach formu-
lated by Colin Farrelly. It is the role of an ethicist to provide argumentative tools 
for deciding important and diffi cult social issues. The criteria provided by Resnik 
seem to be more operative for practical purposes, although Farrelly claims ex-
plicitly that his modifi cations of original, Rawlsian account are motivated by 
realities of life. These observations enable us to present some more general con-
clusions in the next section of the paper.
Conclusions and further questions
There is a perplexing discrepancy in bioethical literature concerning distribu-
tion of HGE. Bio-conservatives, making use of the argument from human rights 
and human dignity, tend to look at HGE as a potentially devastating factor in 
40  Ibidem, p. 27.
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a society. However, once we engage in another type of discourse, particularly 
in a Rawlsian spirit, there is a tendency to allow for a wide range of genetic 
enhancement. David Resnik’s conception is an example of a reasonable voice 
in this debate. This bioethicist is aware of the fact that fi ghting against the de-
velopment of HGE may result in the emergence of black market here and nar-
rowing the group of benefi ciaries of HE to a small group of the most rich people. 
Governmental regulation of the research may rationalize the distribution of ge-
netic enhancements and help in eliminating of arbitrary inequalities.
This does not mean that Farrelly’s proposal, while in my opinion method-
ologically dubious, is worthless. The contrary is the case. This author indicates 
a very important problem of the costs of HGE. Although idealized assumptions 
help to make a conception more intelligible, these assumptions have to be re-
laxed in social practice and we have to be prepared to reason further after the 
relaxation of these assumptions.
In order to be able to perform well in this task, we have to be aware of the 
problems generated by the issue in question. One of the aims of this paper was 
to explicate these problems. Let us recapitulate the analyses with the following 
set of postulates.
If one wants to engage in the discussion of problems of distributive justice and 
HGE, one ought to:
(1) provide for at least working defi nitions of genetic therapy and genetic 
enhancement employed in our line of argumentation. Moreover, it seems 
necessary to formulate some additional distinctions here, in particular, 
the distinctions referring to types of genetic enhancement,
(2) state explicitly which types of HGE are acceptable and which are not ac-
ceptable,
(3) specify the criteria of acceptability, or lack thereof, referred to in the previ-
ous point,
(4) if one accepts consequentialist criteria of acceptability, one ought to spec-
ify the expected consequences. If the consequences are structured with 
a slippery-slope argument, one ought to specify the factors which could 
possibly block the slippery-slope,
(5) provide for default rules concerning fair distribution of genetic endow-
ments,
(6) formulate an explicit position concerning the relation between fair dis-
tribution mentioned in the previous point and freedom of individuals, in 
particular, of reproductive freedom of (potential) parents. 
Fulfi lment of this set of criteria is not an easy task. However, it seems to be 
a necessary condition for a rational, fruitful debate on the subject. This does 
not mean that it is suffi cient to resolve ‘the myriad of issues’ – as Farrelly puts 
it – which appear in the context of HE and distributive justice. In my opinion, 
the following topics ought to be, and very probably will be, the topics of relevant 
discussion in the nearest future.
First, it seems necessary to consider the legitimacy of the state to make dis-
tributive arrangements concerning genetic endowments and the possible risks 
of such arrangements. Although some bioethicists – like Resnik – assume that 
the distribution of HGE resources ought to be regulated by governments due to 
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enormous risks of free market approach in this context, the problem of the risks 
of ascribing this task to the state have to be considered. This problem is, in my 
opinion, urgent, given the problems of states related to protection of personal 
data.
Second, the problem of distributive justice of genetic endowments seems to 
be suitable for game-theoretic modelling. In particular, the tools of game theory 
and in particular of evolutionary game theory may be fruitfully employed for the 
prediction of the future development of HGE and the behaviour of agents. In my 
opinion, the problem of the fair distribution of genetic enhancements ought to be 
more intensively analyzed from the perspective of utilitarianism and the theory 
of rational choice. The possibility of radical genetic enhancement seems to be 
tempting because it potentially enables a group of transformed humans to domi-
nate the ‘naturals’ in many aspects of life. This factor ought to be adequately 
included into a game-theoretic framework. 
Third, as indicated above, the problem of the overall distribution of resources 
in a ‘genetically transformed society’ has to be taken into account. In particular, 
the policies against genetic inequalities have to be considered. One should note 
in this place, that genetically enhanced people would naturally be in a position 
to oppose such policies, because such policies would be counter to their advanta-
geous status.
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